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GREATER THAN LOGOS? KINAESTHETIC EMPATHY 
AND MASS PERSUASION IN THE CHORUSES 
OF PLATO’S LAWS 
 
Lucy Jackson 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When considering the concept of persuasion through emotion, our first instinct 
may be to think of verbal persuasion. This chapter concerns a medium for persua-
sion through emotion that relies primarily on a non-verbal activity – participating 
in and watching the performances of a Classical Greek chorus. Time and time 
again, ancient sources point clearly towards the all-important visual, aural and, 
broadly, experiential effects of choral performance (choreia), beyond the dense 
imagery and ideas described in the choral text. However, the text is frequently the 
only source we have for choral performance, and we must work hard to factor in 
the inevitable impact of music and movement.  
Scholarship, particularly since the late 1970s, has recognized the important 
role played by the singing and dancing chorus in the social, cultural and religious 
lives of cities and communities in the Classical Greek world.1 Plato’s extended 
theorization and discussion of the chorus’s sociological function, found predo-
minantly in books II and VII of his last work, the Laws, has been crucial for our 
understanding of this important role. But only very recently has Plato’s presen-
tation of choral culture been subjected to significant critical analysis.2 Supported 
by a wave of on-going interest in the Laws as a rich (as well as difficult) work, 
together with a continuing fascination with choral performance (both in and out of 
tragedy),3 it is now possible to look afresh at Plato’s contribution to our under-
standing of Classical Greek choral practice. While much of the impact of ancient 
choral performance is all but lost to us in the modern world – or at least lost in any 
obvious sense – it is still possible to gain a better grasp of the traction choral 
performance would have had in ancient Greek communities, and to clarify a 
 
1  Calame (1977) is recognized as seminal for studies of the Classical Greek chorus, and since 
then see Herington (1985), Nagy (1990), Henrichs (1994/5), (Wilson 2000), Kowalzig (2007), 
Kurke (2007) and most recently two edited volumes: Gagné and Hopman (2013) and Billings, 
Budelmann and Macintosh (2013). 
2  See Scolnicov and Brisson (2003), Laks (2005) and (2007), Bobonich (2010), Prauscello 
(2011), (2013) and (2014), Peponi (2013a) and (2013b), and Folch (2015). 
3  Both Peponi (2013a) 212–39 and Prauscello (2011) 133–58 have rightly highlighted that 
Plato’s choruses map most exactly onto the non-dramatic, civic chorus, e.g. the circular or 
‘dithyrambic’ chorus.  
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picture that is necessarily obscured by partial and incomplete sources. Further-
more, the fact that Plato’s Laws contains a comprehensive (if, at times, confusing) 
theory for mass persuasion that uses emotion and choral performance, makes it an 
exemplary subject for an enquiry in the context of a volume such as this. 
A particularly interesting, and before now unrecognized, aspect of Plato’s 
presentation of choral performance in the famous ‘second best city’ of the Laws is 
his description of a phenomenon, ‘kinaesthetic empathy’, that has only just begun 
to be articulated by theorists of cognitive behaviour and performance in the last 
hundred years.4 This process, whereby a spectator experiences a powerful emotive 
connection to a performer based on previous experience of what is being perfor-
med, is described with surprising clarity in book II of the Laws (657d1–6):5  
 
Now while our young men are fitted for actually dancing themselves, we elders regard our-
selves as suitably employed in looking on at them, and enjoying their sport and merry-making, 
now that our former nimbleness is leaving us; and it is our yearning regret for this that causes 
us to propose such contests for those who can best arouse in us through recollection [μνήμηι 
ἐπεγείρειν] the dormant emotions of youth.
6 
 
What makes the use of this modern concept for analysing an ancient performance 
culture excitingly appropriate is that this phenomenon works by being contex-
tualized and situated in a shifting landscape of historical, social and cultural fac-
tors. In a recent article in the Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism, Strukus 
writes that ‘cultural and historic factors are shaped and reshaped by embodied 
experience, and that the unconscious, neural foundations of kinaesthetic empathy 
exist in a dynamic and influential relationship to these other forces’.7 Such a con-
struction of the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy allows us to see it in action 
in diverse locations and times – in fourth-century Athens or in an abstract and 
theoretical ‘second best city’ – and provides a framework for exploring the spe-
cific impact of choral performance in ancient Greek communities.  
That we hear a convincing account of kinaesthetic empathy in an ancient text 
is interesting in and of itself. But that we find such an account in the writings of 
Plato is perhaps surprising if we, as many do, regard this author as constructing a 
subtly but significantly idiosyncratic picture of Classical Greek choral culture.8 
 
4  Fundamental work was done by the philosophers Henri Bergson (1913/1889) and Theodor 
Lipps (1900). Greater interest has been fostered across disciplines since the so-called ‘cor-
poreal turn’, for which see Sheets-Johnstone (2009). Of particular interest for kinaesthetic em-
pathy in cultural practice is Reynolds and Reason (2012). 
5  I use lower case letters when the page references are followed by specific line numbers, capi-
tals when I refer to the whole section. 
6  All translations are from Bury (1927). 
7  Strukus (2011) 89. 
8  See Peponi (2013b) 16–23. On the relationship of Plato’s Laws to contemporary historical and 
social conditions, and to contemporary Crete and Sparta in particular, see Morrow (1960) 5–
10 and 17–92. Kowalzig (2013) 175–6 rightly foregrounds the false distinction often made be-
tween the philosophical and the pragmatic with respect to Plato’s Laws. Useful also is a 
comparison to what Aristotle states in book VIII of his Politics, on which see Peponi (2013a) 
227–9. 
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The fact that the same process is described both in Plato’s text and in contem-
porary studies of performance and cognition is both intriguing and suggestive. 
With this second theoretical underpinning, the possibility for persuasion through 
emotion in choral dance becomes less the brainchild of a brilliant but individual 
thinker, and more a common conception of a process well-known and recognized 
throughout the Classical Greek world. Using and understanding the modern con-
cept of kinaesthetic empathy allows us to see more clearly what Plato is referring 
to, and perhaps encourages us to apply the theory behind this performative pheno-
menon to choral performance in the classical world more broadly.9 
The concept of kinaesthetic empathy and Plato’s construction of the persua-
sive, emotional chorus might be brought closer together by adducing a further 
strand of research conducted in a related area. Both Kowalzig and Kurke have 
shown how choral performance in particular was used in the fifth century to shape 
mythical narratives and affect the communities – past, present and future – that 
attached themselves to those narratives.10 The potential for choral performance to 
persuade fifth-century communities in this way is thoroughly in tune with the 
choral theories set out by Plato. We can also point to later examples of choral 
performance being used in similar ways. The lyric hymns of Philodamus and 
Isyllus, written respectively in the late fourth and early third centuries BCE, pro-
vide new mythological narratives that interact with the politics of the time. In 
doing so, these hymns offer further examples of choral performance being used to 
persuade whole communities. 
That these later lyric texts seem both to exemplify Plato’s choral theory and to 
provide examples of performances that are enriched by an understanding of kin-
aesthetic empathy prompts a bolder hypothesis. We might justifiably use Plato’s 
choral theory in the Laws as indicative of an already existing understanding of 
(and already existing attitudes towards) the potency of choral performance. What 
is more, this non-verbal medium for persuasion may have been viewed, in terms 
of reach and impact, as the most powerful way to persuade in the ancient world. 
This essay, then, seeks to elucidate three things. First, to demonstrate how in 
Plato’s Laws the primary means of persuasion a) occurs through choral perfor-
mance and b) relies entirely on the arousal of emotion through participating in and 
watching these choral performances. Second, to show how Plato seems to des-
cribe the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy in his theorization of the chorus. 
Third, to point to two texts from the Classical and early Hellenistic periods which 
might be read as supporting this picture of the chorus as the persuasive medium 
par excellence. 
 
  
 
9  Space does not allow for a full exploration of the concept of kinaesthetic empathy in relation 
to ancient performance here. This essay will, it is hoped, act as a productive provocation for 
further study I plan to pursue in this area.  
10  Kowalzig (2007) and Kurke (2007). See also Budelmann (2013) 81–98 on choral performance 
as both aesthetic object and ritually productive act. 
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THE PERSUASIVE CHORUS IN PLATO: AN INHERENTLY 
EMOTIONAL STATE 
 
It is worth clarifying at the outset what the goal is for the persuasive endeavours 
of the main speaker (referred to only as ‘the Athenian’) in the Laws. In this work 
we have a relatively clear agenda set out, although it takes some time for it – and 
hence the goals of the vitally important choreia – to emerge. A Spartan, a Cretan 
and an Athenian are taking a long walk from Cnossos to Mount Ida and, after 
three books of conversation, they light upon a concrete task and subject for dis-
cussion, to ‘build up by arguments the framework of a State, as though we were 
erecting it from the foundation’ (702D). The state in question will be a new co-
lony in Crete for which the Cretan, Cleinias, has been chosen (along with ten 
other Cnossians) to set up. Under the broad umbrella of discussing laws and 
government, the question of the citizens’ education (paideia) has already re-
curred a number of times.  
It is always helpful to remember that when paideia (first mentioned at 641B) 
is talked about in the Laws it is, in general, a very different concept to what we 
understand by the term ‘education’ (the most common translation of the Greek 
word). Indeed it is very different to the kind of education set out for the Guar-
dians, described in the Republic.11 Paideia in the Laws, the goal towards which 
the Athenian’s persuasive efforts are aimed, is defined early on in book I and 
repeated at the beginning of book II.  
 
The education [παιδεία] we speak of is training from childhood in goodness, which makes a 
man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be 
ruled righteously. This is the special form of nurture to which, as I suppose, our present argu-
ment would confine the term ‘education’. (643e3–644a2) 
 
With this particular kind of paideia in mind, what emerges from the rich but 
meandering discussion in book II is that the medium for the training and edu-
cating of all citizens should be choral song and dance. Both by watching and par-
ticipating in choral dance, the citizens are to be persuaded to believe that the just 
life is, indeed, the best life and hence to achieve the goal of education as defined 
in books I and II.  
The very particular end towards which the discussion is aiming should be 
factored into how we read the Athenian’s picture of choral culture; rather than 
adhering to tradition or purely honouring the gods, participation in choral culture 
is set up from the very beginning to be primarily for the correct education of the 
citizens. The ‘paideutic’ aspect of choral culture outside Plato’s presentation of it 
in the Laws is certainly likely.12 However, its prominence in the choral culture of 
Plato’s work is nothing like what we can identify from other sources. Caution is 
advisable and it may be that we should understand this particular, prominent aim 
 
11  For the difference in theories of ‘education’ in Republic and the Laws, see Mouze (2000) 57–
69, Jouet-Pastré (2000) and (2006). 
12  See Peponi (2007) 351–62. 
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of choral performance (i.e. that it is primarily for the sake of the paideia of the 
citizens) as, if not unique to Plato, certainly closely tied to his own particular aims 
and agenda in the dialogue.13 
It is surprising how obliquely the chorus is first introduced into the discussion, 
considering the key role it will play in the new Cretan colony. An examination of 
the usefulness of institutional drinking parties is in progress, and the Athenian has 
suggested that there are serious benefits to be had in such drinking-parties, parti-
cularly with the aim of paideia in mind. He states that the safekeeping of correct 
paideia is dependent on the correct establishment of the institution that is to pro-
vide this paideia. We then, somewhat abruptly, turn to the following sketch of the 
cultural and sociological background to the institution of the Greek festival: 
 
Ath: Now these forms of child-training, which consist in right discipline in pleasures and 
pains, grow slack [χαλᾶται] and weakened [διαφθείρεται] to a great extent in the course of 
men’s lives; but the gods, in pity for the human race thus born to misery, have ordained the 
feasts of thanksgiving as periods of respite from their troubles; and they have granted them as 
companions in their feasts [ξυνεορτασταί] the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and 
Dionysus, that they may at least set right again their modes of discipline [ἴν’ ἐπανορθῶνται 
τάς γε τροφάς] by associating in their feasts with gods. We must consider, then, whether the 
account that is harped on nowadays is true to nature? What it says is that, almost without ex-
ception, every young creature [τὸ νέον] is incapable of keeping either its body or its tongue 
quiet, and is always striving to move and to cry, leaping and skipping and delighting in dances 
and games, and uttering, also, noises of every description. Now, whereas all other creatures 
are devoid of any perception of the various kinds of order and disorder in movement (which 
we term rhythm and harmony), to us men the very gods, who were given, as we said, to be our 
fellows in the dance [ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι], have granted the 
pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, whereby they cause us to move and lead our 
choruses, linking us one with another by means of songs and dances; and to the chorus 
[χορός] they have given its name from the ‘cheer’ [χάρις] implanted therein. Shall we accept 
this account to begin with, and postulate that education owes its origin to Apollo and the 
Muses? 
Clein: Yes. 
Ath: Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without chorus-training, and the educated 
man fully chorus-trained? 
Clein: Certainly. (653c7–654b2) 
 
The passage on the surface appears somewhat disorganized.14 In the first half 
there is no mention of choral dance, only the ‘training’ (τροφή) that children re-
ceive and the discipline that may be regained at festivals. Only after the natural 
state of the young (τὸ νέος) is described as one of perpetual movement and ma-
king noise does the description of the gods shift from ‘companions in the feast’ 
(ξυνεορτασταί) to ‘companions in choral dance’ (συγχορευταί); this is the first 
explicit mention of choral dance in book II and only the second mention of the 
 
13  For the ways Plato’s broader agenda in the Laws impacts the presentation of choral culture, 
see Prauscello (2014). 
14  Kurke (2013) 130–2, who gives the fullest analysis of the text, calls this a ‘sneaky’ passage. 
Kowalzig (2013) 174 and Prauscello (2013) 262 construe this passage as primarily addressing 
the divine aspects of choreia. 
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chorus in the entire work. The perception of rhythm and harmony (which, we 
presume, facilitates a kind of training of the movements of the young) is linked to 
mankind’s desire to set up (and, peculiarly, to lead) choruses, and this in turn is 
meant to explain how the relevant gods – the Muses, Apollo and Dionysus – 
might be described as responsible for paideia.15 What we get from this passage, 
however, is the assertion that choreia educates and improves those who are pre-
sent at these festivals. 
What is also hinted at in this passage, and made more explicit throughout 
books II and VII is the idea that, when engaged in choral activity, the choreut is 
particularly susceptible to emotional responses and is, accordingly, in a more mal-
leable state of mind and more ready to be persuaded. The role of pleasure in 
inspiring the setting up of choral dancers is therefore understandably prominent in 
the initial sketch of the sociological origins of choreia and is made explicit soon 
after: 
 
Now then, take a man whose opinion about what is good is correct (it really is good), and 
likewise in the case of the bad (it really is bad), and follows this judgment in practice. He may 
be able to represent [in the choral dance], by word and gesture, and with invariable success, 
his intellectual conception of what is good, even though he gets no pleasure from it and 
feels no hatred for what is bad. Another man may not be very good at keeping on the right 
lines when he uses his body and his voice to represent the good, or at trying to form some 
intellectual conception of it; but he may be very much on the right lines in his feelings of 
pleasure and pain, because he welcomes what is good and loathes what is bad. (654c3–d3) 
 
Here it is made clear that the emotional engagement of the individual within a 
choral performance is not just inevitable, but vital for the best kind of paideia. 
Pleasure and pain are used as the key markers for an individual’s prime moti-
vation to act.16 The potential is recognized for a choreut to sing and dance 
perfectly well and yet not feel the necessary emotions of pleasure and pain at what 
he is enacting. This is shown to be of less value (for the Athenian) than someone 
who may be less physically or vocally skilled, yet responds emotionally to the 
things that he should feel pleasure and pain towards. This is not to say that 
outward appearance and inward emotion are entirely separate in Plato’s 
conception of the choral experience. A little later, the Athenian points us towards 
the connection between a cowardly soul and the postures attached to that state of 
being, or a courageous soul and its concomitant postures (654e9–655b6; 815e4–
816a3). Nevertheless, the emotional response to the choral song and dance is 
clearly of central importance in this presentation of the chorus. The Athenian 
therefore sees the ideal choral performance as being useful for paideia primarily 
via the stirring up of correct emotion in the performer. Within the choral per-
 
15  Prauscello (2013) 258 describes the training alluded to here (2.653c7–654a5, 2.664e2–665a6) 
as ‘the experience of a “correct” physiology of pleasure and pain’. 
16  The tension between reason and the emotions of pleasure and pain is illustrated beautifully in 
a much-discussed passage in book I (644d7–645c1), see Kurke (2013) 123–70. 
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formance, pleasure and pain are not to be inevitable by-products of a particular 
state of mind, but are rather utilized to shape the individual choreut.17 
This highly emotional, reasonless state of the choreut is made clear throughout 
the work and returned to a number of times. Through allusion, or tellingly reveal-
ing but unconscious slippages, the Athenian presents a picture of the choral expe-
rience that is underpinned by two analogic states of being: childhood, and the state 
of ritual frenzy or drunkenness. Through repeatedly associating the choral expe-
rience with these two states of mind, Plato presents the choreut as without rational 
thought and entirely dependent on the sensations of pleasure and pain.18 
The tracing of associations between childhood and choral dance begins with 
that initial adumbration of the sociological origin and function of the chorus 
(653c7–654b2, quoted in full above) where the impulse of the young to move and 
make noise is harnessed and utilized in the song and dance of the chorus. It is 
likely that Plato is able to sketch this rough aetiology of the chorus in the way he 
does because he is drawing together things (festival, paideia, choral dance and 
divine companionship at festival) that were already familiar and closely associated 
in the minds of his audience. But even if Plato’s audience did not have as much 
difficulty as we do in tracing how the logic of the passage proceeds, this should 
not obscure the fact that the associations made between childhood (the inability to 
cease from moving and making noise) and choral dance, and the apparent return 
to childhood inherent in festival celebrations, have an important role in the Athe-
nian’s presentation of the choral experience. Further passages confirm that this 
association between childhood and choral dance is essential for the construction 
of choral culture in the ideal city of the Laws. Indeed this association acts as one 
of a number of associations that encourage our impression of a particularly re-
ceptive choral body. 
We find a fusion of the emotional states of childhood and choreia, in addition 
to further associations with Bacchic frenzy and a lack of reason, in the conclusion 
to the long argument for the social and educational benefit of drinking parties. 
 
There is a little-known current of story and tradition which says that Dionysus was robbed of 
his wits by his stepmother Hera, and that he gets his revenge by stimulating us to Bacchic 
frenzies and all the mad dancing [ἡ μανικὴ χορεία] that results; and this was precisely the 
reason why he made us a present of wine. This sort of story, however, I leave to those who see 
no danger in speaking of the gods in such terms. But I am quite certain of this: no animal that 
enjoys the use of reason in its maturity is ever born with that faculty, or at any rate with it 
fully developed. During the time in which it has not yet attained its characteristic level of 
intelligence, it is completely mad [πᾶν μαίνεται]: it bawls uncontrollably, and as soon as it can 
get on its feet it jumps about with equal abandon. Let’s think back: we said that this situation 
gave rise to music and gymnastics. (672b3–c6) 
 
17  See Peponi (2013a) 212–39 for the emphasis on pleasure in Plato’s description of choreia in 
the Laws. 
18  This touches on the larger debate concerning the existence of ‘rational persuasion’ in the Laws 
– see e.g. Bobonich (1991) 365–88, Powell (1994) 273–321, Laks (2007) 130–52. My own 
view (at present a minority one) is that as far as choral performance goes there is no reason or 
logos, only emotion and habituation, see further below on Laws 670b8–c2. 
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The importance of the myth is highlighted by the Athenian’s professed ignorance 
of its truth (if he thought the myth irrelevant, why include it?). It is in this myth of 
Dionysus’s vengeance that we find the connection between Bacchic frenzy (pos-
sibly inspired by wine) and the loss of one’s rational capacities. We can infer this 
from the fact that the rites are introduced as appropriate vengeance for Hera’s rob-
bing Dionysus of his own soul’s judgment. The gift of wine, Bacchic rites and 
choreia are all linked in this initial myth. The Athenian then goes on to strengthen 
those connections, first between the state of childhood and lack of reason (‘no 
animal that enjoys the use of reason in its maturity is ever born with that faculty, 
or at any rate with it fully developed’) and then between this reasonless state of 
childhood and the frenzy and physical movement found in Bacchic rites (‘During 
the time in which it has not yet attained its characteristic level of intelligence, it is 
completely mad’). The final reminder of the previous discussion of the origins of 
music and gymnastics carries the echo of the association established there too of 
childhood and choreia (653d7–654a5).19 
Although not specifically tied to choreia we see elsewhere the effect of wine 
described as making one feel younger and at the same time making the drinker 
more malleable: ‘when this takes place, the souls of the drinkers turn softer, like 
iron, through being heated, and younger too; whence they become ductile, just as 
when they were young, in the hands of the man who has the skill and ability to 
train and mould them’ (671b8–c2).20 Wine then simulates in the old what comes 
naturally to those who are young, namely, a kind of malleability. This ductile 
quality may be added to the analogous states that touch on or are introduced 
around the presentation of choral performance.  
Later in book VII we find a similar description of these analogous states of 
being in the early stages of the Athenian’s prescriptions for childcare.  
 
Thus when mothers have children suffering from sleeplessness, and want to lull them to rest, 
the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantly 
in their arms; and instead of silence, they use a kind of crooning noise; and thus they literally 
cast a spell upon [καταυλοῦσι] the children (like the victims of Bacchic frenzy) by employing 
the combined movements of dance and song as a remedy. (790d5–e4) 
 
Once more, the Athenian blends the state of childhood (here very young children) 
and Bacchic frenzy, and shows how choreia might act as a medium to affect their 
agitated, emotional state. It is significant that we are reminded in this way (at the 
beginning of book VII where the systematic programme for choral training and 
paideia is to be set out) of the potential vulnerability of those in states of mind 
analogous to that of choral performance. 
By adducing these analogous states in the initial description of choral culture 
in an ideal city, and firmly associating that choral state with a highly emotional 
state, the receptivity and malleability of the choral body is emphasized. Reason 
and logic, then, have little to do with the response and effect of choral dance. As 
 
19  For a slightly different reading of this and the next passage, see Prauscello (2013) 266–70.  
20  See also 666b2–c2. 
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already mentioned above, most people are shown to use pleasure as their prime 
motivator for calling anything (choral or otherwise) good or bad (667B–671A), 
but this is shown to be deficient, and the Athenian points to the example of the 
theatres in Sicily and Italy as evidence of this (659B–C). Instead, the Athenian en-
trusts knowledge of what makes a good or bad choral dance to those in the ideal 
society with the most experience, and hence wisdom, on the subject (657D–659D, 
664E–665D, 668D–671A). Indeed, the Athenian flatly denies that expertise in the 
matters of good and bad choral dances may be found in more than a few members 
of society.21 In no uncertain terms, the choral dancers are said to be acting in utter 
ignorance: 
 
The belief of the general public, that they can form an adequate judgment of merit and demerit 
in matters of harmony and rhythm, is laughable [γελοῖος]: they have only been drilled 
[διηναγκασμένοι] into singing to the pipes and marching in step, and they never stop to think 
that they do all this without the smallest understanding of it [δρῶσιν ταῦτα ἀγνοοῦντες]. 
(670b8–c2) 
 
To dance in the chorus is to return to childhood, to lose one’s sense, to enter an 
initiation and to give oneself up to emotion. The highly emotional and reasonless 
state of mind of the choral dancer seems to deny the ability of the choral dancer to 
reason for herself or gain any agency within choral performances in the ideal city. 
 
 
THE PERSUASIVE CHORUS IN PLATO: 
PERSUASION THROUGH MIMÊSIS 
 
We have seen how engaging in choral performance puts the participant into a 
particularly emotional and malleable state of mind, ready for persuading towards 
civic virtue (whatever that may mean). What is specific to choral performance (as 
opposed to being in one of those similarly emotional states of childhood or 
frenzy) is that the inherently mimetic nature of choreia allows the participant to 
take in and be shaped by what is being sung and danced, at the direction of, 
ultimately, the lawgivers of the second-best city. The potential for mimêsis to 
impact the one who imitates is already well attested and much discussed, 
particularly with reference to Plato’s Republic.22 In that work, mimêsis was 
deemed wholly dangerous. In the Laws, however, it has a place and is relied on in 
many ways to allow the citizens almost to persuade themselves.  
There is an important proviso that follows the well-known sound bite – ‘the 
man who is unpractised in choruses is an uneducated man’. As the Athenian goes 
on to say a little later ‘Our words are, “he sings well and dances well”: ought we, 
 
21  Prauscello (2013) 264 does not read the work as having this ‘anti-rational attitude’, though she 
does not engage directly with the passage quoted here.  
22  See Stalley (1983) 127–9 for a summary of the various kinds of mimêsis referred to in Repub-
lic and what bearing they have on the mimetic aspect of choral performance as described in 
the Laws. For a judicious untangling of Aristotelian mimêsis, see Halliwell (1990) 487–510. 
 156 Lucy Jackson  
or ought we not, to add, “provided that he sings good songs and dances good 
dances”?’ If the content is not, in fact, good, the performer will suffer a kind of 
incorrect training, since the mimetic nature of choral performance serves to 
assimilate the performer with what is performed. The Athenian convinces his 
interlocutors of this by means of a comparison to a man living with the bad habits 
of wicked men. There, even if a man is aware that he should be ashamed to be 
associated with such habits, by a process of assimilation after time, he will grow 
to approve of them.  
 
Is it not probable or rather inevitable that the result here will be exactly the same as what takes 
place when a man who is living amongst the bad habits of wicked men, though he does not 
really abhor but rather accepts and delights in those habits, yet censures them casually, as 
though dimly aware of his own turpitude? In such a case it is, to be sure, inevitable that the 
man thus delighted becomes assimilated to those habits [τότε ὁμοιοῦσθαι], good or bad, in 
which he delights, even though he is ashamed to praise them. Yet what blessing could we 
name, or what curse, greater than that of assimilation that befalls us so inevitably? [καί 
τοι τοῦ τοιούτου τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι;] 
(656b1–7) 
 
The Athenian points us towards the connection between a cowardly soul and the 
postures attached to that state of being, or a courageous soul and its concomitant 
postures (654e9–655b6, 815e4–816a3). We see the power of choral performance 
to shape the opinion of the performer once more, summed up in riddling style 
when the Athenian identifies the advantage of choral performance in the follow-
ing way: ‘we rejoice (χαίρωμεν) whenever we think we are prospering, and, con-
versely, whenever we rejoice we think we are prospering’ (657c5–6). The rela-
tionship between action and the effect on the person performing the action is seen 
as mutually reinforcing. We might also recall the warnings concerning mimêsis 
expressed in the Republic, where imitation of unworthy objects was also deemed 
to be damaging to the soul of the imitator. 
The potential of choral performance, by virtue of its mimetic quality, to im-
prove the performer (and audience too) is shown later in books VIII and XII, 
where we see how this choral capability for positively reinforcing attitudes 
through action is used for the benefit of society with regards to training for war 
(e.g. 830c–831a and 942d2–e1). By allowing for the positive impact of mimêsis 
within the choral body, the Athenian mobilizes a powerful tool for acts of mass 
persuasion.  
 
 
KINAESTHETIC EMPATHY IN THE LAWS 
 
And yet, the power of choreia not only has an effect on those actually partici-
pating in any given choral performance.23 Through the process of kinaesthetic 
 
23  Peponi (2013a) 225–6 has seen in the Laws a strategy to ‘de-aestheticize’ choreia; the re-
peated emphasis on the pleasure of the performer herself means that the choral performance as 
an aesthetic object no longer exists. And yet by reading into Plato’s text a notion of kinaes-
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empathy the persuasion of choral performance can have an impact on both parti-
cipant and spectator.24 Given the universal participation in festivals in this ideal 
city, the inclusion of the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy in the sketch of 
choral culture allows the persuasion to reach every single member of the city in 
one single performance. 
As already stated, then, the Athenian recognizes that what makes the chorus 
all the more powerful as a tool for persuasion is the fact that it is not just the 
choral performer who is persuaded; those who watch the choral performers are 
also affected by the same kinds of emotion as felt by the choreut. The ‘Watching 
Dance’ project, acknowledged as one of the most important research centres for 
examining kinaesthetic empathy in the modern world, notes this phenomenon 
with reference to dance in particular. ‘Spectators of dance experience kinaesthetic 
empathy when, even while sitting still, they feel they are participating in the 
movements they observe, and experience related feelings and ideas’.25 
The Athenian in the Laws alludes to just this experience when describing how 
the elder members of the city no longer dance themselves but instead watch the 
choreia of others and, in watching, remember their own choral experience 
(657d1–6, quoted above). We see this again hinted at in a passage, already dis-
cussed above, describing the aetiology of the festival: ‘... and they have granted 
them as companions in their feasts the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and 
Dionysus, that they may set right again their modes of discipline by associating in 
their feasts with gods’ (654c7–d5). Here the idea is clear that associating with 
those who are, as Prauscello has put it, examples of ‘embodied morality’26 will 
have an effect on everyone present, whether they’re performers or spectators. 
More generally throughout book II, the discussion focuses variously on the parti-
cipant and the observer of choral performance, strongly suggesting that, in Plato’s 
eyes, there was no great distance between the two experiences. Peponi discusses a 
passage (655D–656A) that highlights the intriguing slippage between internal and 
external spectator (i.e. performer and spectator), an example of the way that per-
former and spectator are often assimilated in the Laws.27 Such a slippage may be 
deliberate on the part of the author. Alternatively we might infer from such as-
similations of a performer and a spectator’s experience that this was already a 
commonly held attitude in Plato’s contemporary world. 
 
thetic empathy, those who watch the choral performance and those who perform it need not 
necessarily be as rigidly separated as Peponi suggests. The repeated blurring of boundaries 
between spectator and performer, identified by Peponi herself, seems to indicate the connec-
tion between the two is so close as to be inseparable. 
24  Prauscello (2013) 259 formulates this in terms of mimêsis – ‘[In the Laws mimêsis] is active at 
both a representational (mimêsis qua representation) and performative level (mimêsis qua en-
actment)’. 
25  http://www.watchingdance.org/research/kinesthetic_empathy/index.php accessed 30th March 
2015. 
26  Prauscello (2013) 259. 
27  Prauscello (2013) 218–20. 
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The power of using choral performance as a medium for persuasion will, 
therefore, work on two levels. First, it is an activity that places the performer in an 
emotional and particularly receptive state. Second, the familiarity of all citizens 
with the content of choral dance enables those attitudes to be reinforced through 
kinaesthetic empathy on an almost daily basis, according to the calendar described 
later on in the Laws. As with so much in the Laws, this idea is not clearly stated 
(although it is certainly alluded to, see above). However, it seems reasonable to 
see the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy as very much part of the Athenian’s 
justification for the central importance of choral culture in the construction of the 
ideal city in the Laws. 
 
 
THE CHORUS IN CLASSICAL GREECE: 
A WEAPON OF MASS PERSUASION 
 
Is the model that Plato outlines in the Laws a plausible example of an alternative 
medium for persuasion in Classical Greece? What I would like to do in the final 
part of this chapter is suggest how this kind of persuasion (that is, persuasion 
through participating in and watching choral performance) might be recognized in 
the wider world of Classical Greece. That choral performance acted both to rein-
force and to reinvent social and cultural attitudes in the Classical period is no 
longer in question. Recent work has moved forward the discussion of the inter-
section between choral poetry and history considerably.28 While for Plato the 
power of choral performance lies in the harmony of movement and music and the 
pleasurable acculturation of certain values, Kowalzig has argued that the power of 
choral performance lies in its unifying myth and ritual, elements that in them-
selves work to unite past and present.  
 
It is through choral performance that myth and ritual become socially effective, for it offers a 
medium for myth and ritual to come together…. [Choral performances] emerge as a creative 
means for the delineation of worshipping communities by allowing for a constant recon-
figuration of mythical pasts and ritual presents. Religious song, performances of myth and 
ritual, turn out to be a productive activity with a full and dynamic share in historical processes 
and social change, above all through the way it opens up new social realities formulated 
through the myth-ritual interface.
29 
 
Might we compare the ‘productive activity’ Kowalzig identifies in choral lyric 
with the persuasive power accorded to choral performance in Plato? There are 
certainly some suggestive comparisons to be made with Strukus’s recognition that 
‘cultural and historic factors are shaped and reshaped by embodied experience’, 
with respect to kinaesthetic empathy.30 In Athens, if not all over Greece, the level 
of participation in civic choruses was such that we can justifiably imagine both 
 
28  Again Kowalzig (2007) and Kurke (2007) are fundamental here. 
29  Kowalzig (2007) 393. 
30  See note 7 above. 
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performer and spectator as being familiar with at least a certain level of choral 
choreography and language.31 With this neuro-physiological language set along-
side texts that lend themselves well to the kind of process outlined by both Plato 
and modern performance theorists like Strukus, the case for the persuasive power 
of choreia becomes more credible. 
Added to this we might also briefly point to two hymns, written in the late 
fourth and early third centuries BCE respectively, that have a comparable socio-
political agenda to the texts analysed by Kowalzig and Kurke. A paean written by 
Isyllus and inscribed at Epidaurus around the very beginning of the third century, 
gives the god Asclepius a thoroughly Epidaurian aetiology.32 It seems that, in 
doing so, the choral performance of the hymn provided the means of persuasion to 
all those who saw the chorus perform, or read the inscribed hymn thereafter. The 
story they were being persuaded to believe was that, contrary to any other tales of 
Asclepius’s heritage, this story that he belonged and had always belonged in Epi-
daurus held the greatest authority. A similar kind of story could be told of Philo-
damus’s paean to Dionysus.33 In that fragmentary inscription dated to 340/39 
BCE, the gods Apollo and Dionysus are brought close together,34 a move that 
seems to have been rooted in some kind of actual change at Delphi (where the 
hymn was found) and the possible acceptance of Dionysus into the cult of Apollo 
simultaneous with the rebuilding of his temple. These hymns were then inscribed 
on stone for future visitors to see and be persuaded of their authoritative content, 
namely, the ‘rebranding’ of Dionysus as majestic and lordly as opposed to the 
ecstasy and frenzy so frequently associated with the god.35 The potential for a 
reader to relive the experience of viewing or performing in that choral perfor-
mance fits nicely with the blurred conception of spectator/performer prompted by 
the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the fifth, fourth and third centuries BCE, both before and after the time when 
Plato was writing, there are sources – literary and epigraphic – testifying to or 
hinting at the power of choral performance to persuade and shape the attitudes 
both of those citizens who take part in the performance and the spectators who 
make up the broader community. Taken on their own we might be less inclined to 
 
31  Around 10% of the male population (citizens and non-citizens) of Athens were required to 
participate in the choruses each year (not only of the Great Dionysia but also all the other 
festivals that included choral performances: the Lenaia, Rural Dionysia, Thargelia, the Little 
and Great Panathenaia and, possibly, the Promethia and Hephaistia). 
32  For full discussion of this poem and its political agenda, see Kolde (2003). 
33  See most recently Bouchon, Brillet-Dubois and Le Meur-Weissman (2012) and Calame 
(2009) on this hymn. 
34  A kind of ‘religious syncretism’, Rutherford (2001) 132. Furley and Bremer (2001) 73 argue 
against the term ‘syncretism’ as the identities of the two gods are maintained. 
35  Furley and Bremer (2001) 67. 
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award these poems and performances any serious persuasive power. Yet in light 
of the presentation of the power of choral performance in Plato’s Laws, and 
strengthened by an understanding of the phenomenon of kinaesthetic empathy, we 
may be more justified in crediting choreia, at least in Classical Greece, with a 
persuasive power that outweighed the persuasions of logos. 
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